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The nature of practical reasoning is a matter of considerable philosophical interest, particularly the extent to which the process can be understood in terms of standard (i.e. deductive) reasoning, and what form it might take.  Even were it to turn out, e.g. as per Aristotle, that essential elements cannot be accommodated deductively, it would still remain of interest to delimit any and all respects that can be so accommodated.






Assumed:  (a) {A} and {B} are logically independent states of affairs under deliberative consideration, colloquially “alternatives”; (b) the alternatives under consideration can include logical combinations of alternatives (e.g. {A-and-B} as well as {A} and {B}); (c) all other things are equal (i.e. {A}, {B}, and their logical compounds are the only relevant valuative considerations); and (d) statements of preference must concern mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive alternatives (the rationale for and significance of this will emerge below).

Further assumed, with respect to an implicit chooser:  (1) some alternatives are preferable to others; and (2) some alternatives can, while some cannot, be done.  For example, suppose {A} is {putting a token in a drink machine} and {B} is {getting something to drink}.  Given the condition of being thirsty, {B} is obviously preferable to {not-B}; but if we assume for the sake of simplicity that tokens are free, the loss of a token ({not-A} as opposed to {A}) becomes a matter of indifference.  Again for simplicity’s sake, assume that apart from {A} there are no other means available for getting something to drink.






1.  Choose what is preferable and can be done.			CONCEPTUAL

2.  {B} is preferable to {not-B}.					GIVEN

3.  {B} cannot be done.						GIVEN

4.  {A} can be done.							GIVEN

5.  {A} is necessary and sufficient for {B}.				GIVEN

6.  Neither {A} nor {not-A} is preferable to the other.		GIVEN

7.  {A-and-B} and {not-A-and-B} are preferable to {A-and-not-B} and {not-A-and-not-B}.
									FROM 2 & 6

8.  Neither {not-A-and-B} nor {A-and-not-B} can be done.		FROM 5

9.  {A-and-B} is preferable to {not-A-and-not-B}.			FROM 7 & 8

10.  {A-and-B} can be done.						FROM 4 & 5

11.  Choose {A-and-B}.						FROM 1, 9 & 10


REMARKS ON THE DEDUCTION

Step 3 is not really necessary, but has been included to show that one cannot infer the choice of {B} immediately from its preferability.  What one can and cannot do directly, one’s “basic actions”, involve a line that can be drawn in different ways for different reasons.  Here it is only assumed that there are limits in particular circumstances – there are things one cannot directly do – but that one can get around that restriction insofar as they may be related in faciliatory (causal, mereological) ways with things one can directly do (e.g. {A}).






On the present approach, practical reasoning is not fundamentally a matter of inferring means from ends, but rather one of determining, with regard to the possible alternatives available in a given circumstance, which is the most preferable.  Indeed, were one “all powerful” like e.g. a tinpot despot, then all wishes would be commands and one might never have to consider what means might be required.

Instrumentality can now be seen to be a consequence of two remarkably uncontroversial factors:  one, in most circumstances there are limits to what a person can directly achieve; and two, in most of those circumstances there are nonetheless things that a person can directly achieve that will facilitate (make more likely) the occurrence of those that cannot.  Few would care to dispute the existence of causality or mereology in the world, nor the existence of human limitations, but those factors are all that is needed to explain the relevance of means-end considerations to the alternatives evaluated in practical deliberation. 

I have endeavored here simply to provide an illustrative example of deductive practical reasoning.  Nonetheless, it should be noted that there has been much speculation as to what principles need be assumed by practical reasoning, and the extent to which those principles might implicate further concerns of a moral nature.  On my accounting, there is only one conceptual principle required, viz. step 1:  in effect, the admonition to “Do the best you can!”  And this principle is arguably trivial, though not so trivial that you could not flout it at your own peril.  Obviously, one should choose what one takes to be preferable – that’s what “preferable” means; equally obviously, one should not choose to do what one cannot do – that’s impossible!  (Even e.g. the athlete pushing beyond his or her limits is not choosing to do the impossible, but is choosing to try to do the impossible, which is perfectly possible.)



